


Intelligence Bulletin

VOL III ★ NO 9
MAY 1945



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION • WAR DEPARTMENT • WASHINGTON D. C.
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Have You Learned A Lesson About The Enemy?

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VOL. III NO. 9

MAY 1945

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Cover Illustration—The Japanese haul a disassembled 20-mm gun up a hillside to a cave position in the Bamban River area.





JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL TACTICS

IN CENTRAL BURMA

Late in 1944 Japanese troops in Central Burma, badly battered after a year of futile fighting in the northern jungles, began to withdraw from the Chindwin River to the vicinity of Shwebo Village—a community on the northern approach to the strategic city of Mandalay. Closely pressed by advancing British and Indian troops, the Japanese covered their retreat with a series of effective rear-guard actions fought principally by small units in excellently selected delaying positions.

Notable throughout these skirmishes was the enemy's departure from his practice of conducting a determined suicide stand. Instead, the Jap rear-guard units showed ability in harassing the advance elements of the Allied column during the day, and then withdrawing during the night without suffering heavy casualties, even though a delaying position had been encircled completely. By such actions the Japs avoided the isolation and eventual destruction of any sizable portion of their troops.

The rear guard generally used an outpost of a half-dozen men supported by a light machine gun in front of the main delaying position.

TERRAIN

The retreat of the northernmost division of the Japanese Burma force—and the coincident delaying actions—took place over a distance of 30 miles in extremely varied terrain. In its early phase the withdrawal was conducted through very rugged and hilly terrain covered with thick forest and jungle, some of the hills rising to 2,500 feet. The intermediate phase took place through a plain covered by open forest, large open spaces, and a few hills, while the remainder of the terrain into Shwebo was paddy country and a semi-arid, scrub-covered plain which is the driest part of Burma. The paddy country is criss-crossed with many tree-fringed stream beds, and small open forests.

Through these areas the Japanese conducted an orderly retreat. Enemy rear-guard units were small, and contact with a platoon or more was made on only about 20 occasions. The positions selected for a determined defense appeared to have been prepared in advance and for larger forces than those which ultimately occupied them. Most of these positions were very well chosen, had good fields of fire, and were well camouflaged. They were selected to confront an attacking force with the most difficult terrain in which to employ a flanking maneuver.

POSITIONS

During the early phases of retreat through the jungle country, the positions usually were selected along trails where the jungle growth was thickest on either side, or else on narrow rises flanked by steep cliffs. However, most of the rear-guard combat took place in the plains country, where the main defenses and their accompanying outposts almost always were situated behind a stream crossing, and where the Japs were afforded an open field of fire. In the paddy country the favorite position also seemed to be at stream crossings, although some stands were made at forested patches and the cultivated areas of

villages. In scrub country the Japs favored a crossroad near a village.

On those occasions when the rear guard decided to make a reasonably 'determined stand, it became the enemy's practice to establish one, and sometimes two, outpost positions anywhere from 300 yards to 1 mile in advance of his main position. A typical disposition had a forward outpost of a half-dozen men with a light machine gun, who may or may not have dug positions. Some distance in the rear of this, a second outpost of platoon strength would be situated in bunkers and other prepared positions. Sometimes, instead of outposts, a screen of snipers would be pushed forward from the main position.

REAR-GUARD TACTICS

It was the function of the outposts to open fire as soon as the Allied advance guard came within range, and so pin down the leading elements and force them to deploy and waste time probing for the flanks of the Jap position. This accomplished, the outpost would retire before it was encircled. On occasions when a sniper screen was used in place of outposts, the snipers would fire a few rounds at the advance guard, slip out of their trees, retire 100 yards to a new position, then fire and retire again at the first opportunity. This procedure was continued until the snipers had fallen back to the main defense position.

The reaction of the rear guard varied when the advance elements of the British column came within range of the main position. Sometimes the Jap force would open a concentrated and sustained fire of small arms, machine guns, and grenade launchers. At other times the Jap fire was cautious, so as not to reveal the position of bunkers or gun positions. Often the rear guard would send out a single Jap, armed with a machine gun, whose mission was to find a position on the flank of the

approaching British where he would fire a few bursts and then retire, in order to confuse the deploying British.

A variation of this tactic was used. Instead of meeting the British column with fire from outposts and snipers, sometimes the rear-guard force in the main position would be the first to give combat. Then, as the action developed, they would send out groups of three to four snipers, who would harass the flanks and rear of the attackers.


Usually, the Jap rear guard was content to compel the attacking force to deploy extensively in an effort to find and envelop the Japanese flanks. Before this envelopment became complete, the rear guard generally withdrew. However, on occasion, the Japs permitted their position to be encircled completely, and at such times their defense was determined and well conducted. The Japs were skillful in anticipating an attack against their flank and in moving troops within their position to meet it.

The majority of the rear-guard skirmishes lasted only until dark, at which time the Japs would fall back to a new position. However, there were several occasions when the rear guard stood its ground for 2 days, apparently confident of its ability to disperse through the encircling positions. Once, near a village named Leiktu, the Japanese rear guard stayed in position for 5 days.

POSITION NEAR LEIKTU

The Japanese position near Leiktu Village was one of the largest encountered by the advancing British column. Constructed for an all-around defense, this oblong perimeter sprawled along the edge of a dry stream bed running east and west, and encompassed the stream crossing of the north-south road to Shwebo—the British axis of advance.

The stream bed, which was 8 feet deep and from 15 to 20 feet in width, lay within the northern edge of the perimeter



A sketch of the Japanese perimeter near Leiktu.



which faced the British advance. The terrain south of the stream consisted of a narrow patch of heavy woods which concealed the defenses. North of the stream the terrain consisted of dry paddy fields extending for the most part across the front of the defenses and affording the Japanese excellent fields of fire. The position covered a front of about 600 yards, and was an average of about 150 yards in depth, although the portion of the perimeter that encompassed the road was 300 yards wide.

Although a perimeter defense had been established, the field works were concentrated in some areas, and scattered and weak in others. Bunkers, weapons emplacements, foxholes, and slit trenches were used. Besides individual weapons, the Japanese had at least one antitank gun, which was emplaced along the road, and many light and medium machine guns. The machine guns along the northern front of the perimeter were sighted to fire across the paddy fields, and could engage the road approach to the stream. An antitank barricade of railroad ties and rails had been built at the stream crossing, and the Japs in position near this road block were liberally equipped with Molotov cock-tails. All individual and gun emplacements were thoroughly concealed in the heavy vegetation, and some forward emplacements were covered by other automatic weapons set deeper within the perimeter. The bulk of the defenses were located along the northern edge of the perimeter, the Japanese appar-

Top: View toward the road (beyond trees) from the northeast corner of the perimeter and showing the field of fire afforded by the rice paddy.

Below: Airphoto of a portion of the Jap perimeter near Leiktu viewed from the direction of approach by the British column. The dotted line defines the forward edge of the Japanese defenses hidden in the patch of forest. The dry stream bed may be seen just inside the perimeter in the lower right-hand corner. The road to Leiku crosses the upper right.

ently counting upon the thick undergrowth to delay sufficiently a surprise assault from another direction. Brushwood fences were erected to strengthen the natural barriers of trees and bushes.

This position was occupied by an estimated company of from 150 to 200 men who held the British in this area for 5 days; however, the Jap defense was aided by three similar positions in the area, which also had to be dealt with by the advancing column.

WITHDRAWAL FROM POSITION

When the Jap rear guard abandoned a delaying position, such a move was made at night, usually starting about 1 hour after sunset. Most of the time the Japs were quite noisy during their preparations for a withdrawal. Nevertheless, they were accustomed to leaving a light machine gunner or a sniper in position until first light. He would fire an occasional burst to create the impression that the position was still occupied.

After the withdrawal had begun, the Japanese would disperse in groups of three or four men, who would work their way back over unmapped trails and rendezvous at an assembly point about $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile to the rear. From here the rear guard would proceed in column down the trail until it came to the position selected for the next stand.



IWO JIMA

On the morning of 19 February, one of the toughest battles of the war started on a little chunk of volcanic terrain less than 800 miles from Tokyo. We needed Iwo Jima and the Japs knew we needed it. They made the whole island a fort.

We sent three Marine divisions to take Iwo. Shortly after the assault waves had landed, it became evident that the Marines were up against extremely strong defenses. After 5 days of bitter fighting, it was plain that Iwo, with its pillboxes, caves, tunnels, tank traps, and mines, had more well-camouflaged strongpoints than had at first been visible.

Our landing beaches were enfiladed with fire from cave-pocked Mt. Surabachi on the left flank, and from a fortified line stretching across the island at right angles to the right flank. The volcanic ash which covered the island made the use of tanks difficult, if not impossible, and many of the defenses fell only to flame throwers and grenades.

Organized resistance on Iwo ended on 16 March—nearly a month after D-day. In that time the Marines had taken what Vice-Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner called “as well-defended a fixed position as exists anywhere in the world today”. We paid for Iwo with over 19,000 casualties of all kinds. For losing Iwo the Japs paid too—suffering over 21,000 casualties, all dead.

The following U.S. Marine Corps photos graphically illustrate some of the powerful Japanese defenses found on Iwo Jima.



Mt. Suribachi, whose cliff defenses enfiladed the landing beaches, was pocked with caves dug into the volcanic rock. Some of these caves housed coastal defense guns behind concrete embrasures.




On the beach, likely tank approaches were blocked with a Jap version of dragon's teeth. Tank ditches and extensive minefields, which included depth charges and torpedo heads, also were used.



Many pillboxes were invisible from the sea, were so constructed as to give little traverse, but were situated in such a way that they enfiladed the beaches with heavy fire.



Pillboxes of this type had to be taken before the beach could be relieved of direct enemy fire. This, and the one pictured above, commanded the beach on the West side of the island.



Many pillboxes were made of steel-reinforced concrete, some as much as 4 feet thick. This one, which housed a 25-mm automatic cannon, overlooked Red Beach Number One.



Other emplacements were made of logs and stone and were covered with volcanic ash. Over 800 pillboxes of various types were found in one division sector alone.



This ash-covered, concrete pillbox was burned out by Marines on the first day of the landing. Many open-type emplacements also were used.




A close-up of the pillbox pictured above. Besides pillboxes, the Japs had concrete shelters and blockhouses—many of them connected by trenches and tunnels.




Water was a problem on Iwo. The Japs had built these underground storage tanks, but in the later phases of the fighting they had to rely on what little rain water they could catch.



On the fifth day Marines file past a Model 10 dual-purpose 120-mm gun which covers Motoyama Airfield Number One (in the background). Mt. Suribachi is at the extreme left.



Another gun of the same model is emplaced along the coast. The Japs had many anti-aircraft guns of this type sited for terrestrial fire. Some of them fired directly into our beachhead.



A Model 96 twin 25-mm anti-aircraft gun overlooks a beach. The Japs had over 200 such weapons emplaced on the island in an attempt to counter our air superiority.



Another such weapon is emplaced in a stone revetment on the high ground flanking Airfield Number One. The dead Jap in the communication trench to the left didn't get out fast enough.



The Bamban Hills

A Prepared Defense of Rough Terrain

When the U.S. forces were advancing on the Clark Field area on Luzon, the enemy commander in that area, Major General Tsukada, decided not to attempt an all-out defense of the airfields themselves. "Against the attacks of the materially well-equipped enemy," General Tsukada told his troops, "we will not offer resistance." Instead, his forces would fight delaying actions into the hills to the west, where, by means of artillery fire and infiltration attacks, he hoped to prevent the Americans from utilizing the Clark Field air center.

With this in mind, Tsukada directed that his command—a large one, consisting of miscellaneous air corps and service units, with a hard core of combat troops including glider-borne infantry and elements of the 2d Armored Division—complete and occupy what he called "protective installations" in the hills. These installations were in the process of preparation, in accordance with plans "made in cooperation with the Army and Navy, and with the help of the technicians."

The "protective installations", which actually had been started weeks, if not months, before the actual U.S. landing, constituted what is probably the most elaborate and extensive

system of cave and tunnel defenses yet encountered in the Southwest Pacific. Over a front of 12,000 yards, and to a depth of 16,000 yards, the Japanese organized the terrain for a protracted last-ditch defense.

Fanning out from Mt. Pinatubo, and running in a northeasterly direction behind Fort Stotsenburg, there is a series of steep, broken ridges, separated by deep, interlocking ravines and canyons. This rocky ground is covered with cogon grass, cane-brake, and scattered timber on the higher elevations, and with heavy jungle growth along watercourses and in ravines.

When the U.S. forces had completely neutralized the Clark Field area, and were threatening a ground offensive, the enemy shifted his defenses from the open plain to this rugged terrain. Months before, large caves and tunnels had been carved in the hard rock, to protect supplies and personnel against U.S. air attacks. Bulk stores in huge quantities were transferred from Fort Stotsenburg to the less vulnerable tunnels. The antiaircraft guns (ranging in size from 20-mm to 120-mm) that surrounded the field were moved to new positions blasted in the rocky hill slopes and were laid for terrestrial fire. In some cases these guns evidently had been broken down into components, had been manhandled laboriously up almost vertical slopes, and had been emplaced in caves and recesses hewn out of solid rock. Literally hundreds of aircraft machine guns had been removed from the battered planes that littered the Clark airfields, and had been carried up into the hills. Individual tunnels had been well stocked with food, ammunition, and other supplies so that each small group of Japs could continue to fight regardless of the fate of the other groups.

Gun positions had been planned to provide mutual support and to cover the barren approaches. In many instances the guns had 2,000-yard to 4,000-yard fields of fire for both plunging and grazing types of fire. For once the Japs had more than an


abundance of automatic weapons; by way of illustration, 26 aircraft machine guns were found in positions on a single small knoll.

The drawing on page 20 has been adapted from a captured map. It shows the tunnel defenses—a total of 23, large and small—on two hills. All these tunnels were found and reduced by the U.S. assault troops.

The illustration on page 22 is an overlay of the Japanese defenses encountered on an extension of Storm King Mountain, a 1,000-foot ridge. All the slopes of this ridge were completely covered with heavy timber, canebrake, and undergrowth. In searching for suitable approaches to the positions, elements of a U.S. infantry division discovered that the north, south, and west slopes of the hill were precipitous. Fire from automatic



This is Snake Hill West, which is typical of the elevations that the Japanese fortified in the Bamban River area.



Some Japanese tunnel defenses in the Bamban River area.


weapons, together with grenades tossed down the steep banks, made it almost suicidal to advance by these approaches.

The only suitable route was from the east, along a narrow neck that connects the extension with the main mass of Storm King Mountain. This route also was covered by fire from weapons of all calibers. The location of the perfectly concealed positions was disclosed only when fire was received at very close range. Often the enemy allowed leading elements to pass, before opening fire. Several days were devoted to reducing and mopping up these positions, and the employment of approximately a battalion of infantry and massed supporting artillery was required. Japanese strength in the area was subsequently estimated to have been a single reinforced company.

Various types of individual emplacements encountered not only on Storm King Mountain, but throughout the entire hill area, are illustrated on page 22. Each individual position had been equipped to withstand a fairly long siege. Since these positions had only narrow apertures, direct hits with grenades, demolitions, and artillery were necessary to reduce the threat from these points and thus permit further assault.

Most of the enemy's caves and tunnels were mutually supporting, and were further protected by fire from a series of gun positions dug-in on high ground above and to the flanks. These caves and tunnels could be reduced only by continuous direct artillery fire, white-phosphorus smoke, demolitions, flame throwers, and field expedients devised on the spot. One report states that three separate demolitions, 20 hand grenades, a large volume of fire from automatic weapons, and finally a full case of TNT, were required to rout the Japs from one compartmented cave.

No matter how heavy a concentration of fire the U.S. supporting weapons placed on these positions—and the weapons included M-10's, M-8's, and 105-mm and 155-mm artillery—



Weapons used in the defense of the extension of Storm King Mountain.

the final elimination of the Japs hiding in the cave recesses was in plain truth the job of the assaulting infantry. Using both day and night tactics, under constant fire from Jap supporting positions on the flanks and front, and exposed on the bald face of the mountains without concealment of any kind, the infantrymen found it necessary to carve footholds out of the steep slopes in order to maintain balance and permit the free use of weapons. Moreover, it was necessary to carry close-assault weapons and demolitions up these slopes, and then get them into position for the final assault. The painful and time-consuming method of trial and error had to be employed. It might be said that the reduction of each cave was in itself a minor campaign.


The U.S. victory in this area was a grim dispensation of justice. Fort Stotsenburg had been the home station of the 26th Cavalry Regiment, a unit annihilated at the beginning of the war, when it fought a rear-guard action to cover the withdrawal of U.S. troops to Bataan.

Japanese cave warfare is not new. Biak, Saipan, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima attest to this. However, it is probable that the caves in the Fort Stotsenburg-Bamban River area represent the most extensive system of cave defenses, organized in depth and supported by excellent secondary positions, that has yet been encountered.




← TWIN-MOUNT FLEXIBLE GUN,
7.7-MM. POSITION

HEAVY MG POSITION →



↑ LIGHT MG POSITION

Typical individual emplacements encountered in the Storm King area.



RIFLE POSITION



50-MM GRENADE DISCHARGER
POSITION





A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON JAP DEMOLITIONS IN MANILA

The battle for Manila, in which American troops for the first time engaged the Japanese in combat in the streets and buildings of a major city, uncovered a pattern for destruction by demolition that surpassed all previous use of mines and explosives by troops of the Japanese Empire. Significantly, the Japs for the first time made a large-scale use of naval depth charges as land mines, a tactic that was repeated in their defense of Iwo Jima.

In addition to depth charges, the Japanese used other explosives in such large and concentrated charges that a U.S. Navy lieutenant, an expert on bomb disposal who had removed mines in Cassino and in North Africa, described the Manila demolitions as fantastic. One American division commander estimated that 90 percent of the Japanese who remained to fight in the city were demolition experts.


As U.S. troops pushed into the outskirts of Manila early in

February, the Japanese commander on Luzon chose to abandon the Philippine capital, except for a comparatively small, fanatical force which was left behind to delay the Americans, destroy the city, and ultimately die in its ruins. Typical of the defenses encountered were those in Loloma Cemetery.

Occupying an area of half a square mile, Loloma Cemetery is located in Northern Manila and from it the Japanese were able to cover an airfield and two highway approaches to the city. Here the Japanese had built pillboxes, dug trenches, and emplaced two 120-mm dual-purpose naval guns. Three 25-mm single-barrel, naval antiaircraft guns had been installed in pillboxes for ground fire. These pillboxes resembled mounds covering tombs, were sodded, and had tombstones or statues mounted on them. Set among the many monuments and mausoleums, the pillboxes were well camouflaged by their surroundings.

Despite these elaborate defenses, the Japs did not defend Loloma. They withdrew, leaving behind an extensive mine system on the northern and eastern approaches to the cemetery. Among the graves and along the inner road network, 120 naval antisubmarine depth charges had been laid about 20 to 30 feet apart. These charges had been expertly camouflaged with sod, and could be detonated by a man's weight.

The Japanese depth charge, which contains 250 pounds of explosive, is 30 inches long and 18 inches in diameter, and resembles an ash can. A well, or tube, set in one end of the charge holds a booster, a detonating cap, and a simple striker pin. There is no safety pin or retaining spring to hold the striker immobile. After a mine had been buried, the Japs set an improvised wooden pressure plate in contact with the firing mechanism. The pressure plate consisted of a board cover, to the center of which a short wooden post had been attached at right angles. The post, which acted as a plunger against the



Quarter-section sketch of a Jap naval depth charge improvised as a land mine.

striker, would be inserted into the fuze well and held in position by a square frame of four boards nailed together.

The highway to the east of the cemetery also had been mined with depth charges, one of which had been detonated. The explosion had left a crater from 12 to 15 feet deep and some 25 feet in diameter. Further down the road, holes had been dug for more depth charges, which were found lying along the side of the road.

Before the Japanese withdrew from Loloma, they had booby-trapped the nearby church. A Filipino who had entered the church in search of food was killed when he exploded a large

demolition charge which had been set in the rafters of the structure. The floor of the attic was demolished, and the interior of the church ruined.

St. Paul's Novitiate, a Manila convent, also had been mined and prepared for defense. In a wall around the convent, loopholes had been cut at 10-foot intervals about 18 inches above the ground. Each loophole housed a 20-mm machine gun, 22 such guns having been emplaced along one wall. A dense minefield had been laid in front of the wall.

In the fields and along the roads in this area, the Japanese had planted more of the depth-charge mines. On top of each of these charges, however, a Model 3 ceramic land mine had been buried, and acted as a detonator and booster. These mines were effective against some of our tanks, and one Sherman was blown off the road and turned over, and the turret was blown some 60 feet free of the tank.

During the Japanese occupation of Manila, the enemy had turned many buildings and homes north of the Pasig River into arsenals and munitions dumps. These arsenals were defended by 20-mm and lighter-caliber machine guns and depth-charge mines buried along the approaches. The Japanese would set fire to these buildings as they withdrew, and the mines within them would go off with terrific explosions. Many of the best buildings south of the Pasig River had been similarly converted into arsenals.

Besides the depth-charge mines, the Japanese in some sections of the city reverted to their now common practice of burying aerial bombs as mines. Dewey Boulevard, Manila's waterfront thoroughfare, was mined for some distance with 250-pound bombs. A similar minefield of these bombs—in this case, electrically detonated—was located in the outskirts of the city.



Shoot 'Em Back!

**Captured enemy mortar shells used to be destroyed.
Now U. S. troops have learned to shoot 'em back.**

Mortar men in the Pacific who, after a night of harassing fire, have "sweated out" the resupply of ammunition from beachhead to gun positions, may be interested to know that many heavy weapons companies have been supplementing their ammunition allowances with captured Model 100 Japanese 81-mm mortar shells.

Consequently, Ordnance Intelligence men on Luzon, working with a mortar crew from the 6th Ranger Battalion, have conducted tests to acquire definite information as to the interchangeability of Japanese and U.S. 81-mm mortars and ammunition. The tests have provided a few simple rules that may serve as a guide to the use of this type of enemy ordnance. However, since Jap ammunition is not as safe to handle as is the U. S. equivalent, the use of Jap shells is recommended as an emergency measure only.

U. S. MORTAR, JAP SHELLS

If you have available a quantity of captured Japanese Model 100 81-mm ammunition, it may be fired from the U.S. 81-mm mortar, provided that only undamaged shells are used. The



The Model 100 Japanese 81-mm mortar shell.

use of Japanese ammunition that has been wet or exposed to moisture should be avoided whenever possible.

The Model 100 shells may be fired by using the firing tables for the U.S. M43A1 shells. However, if the Japanese increments are used, the shells may fall about 10 percent short of the range expected of U.S. ammunition fired under the same conditions. Unburned portions of the Jap increments may collect in the mortar tube; consequently the tube must be cleaned after every ten rounds. Because the Japanese increments are unreliable, the ammunition should not be used when fire is being delivered over the heads of friendly troops, particularly during an attack. The ammunition is suitable for firing harassing missions.

You should expect a high percentage of misfires when using Japanese mortar ammunition. When a misfire occurs, check to see whether the brass cap from the ignition cartridge of the preceding round has stuck on the firing pin.

The accuracy and reliability of the Japanese ammunition is increased greatly by replacing the Japanese increments with unused increments removed from U.S. shells.

JAP MORTAR, U. S. SHELLS

There have been reports of some heavy weapons units replacing damaged mortar tubes with captured Japanese Model 97 81-mm tubes.

If you have occasion to make such a replacement, or if you have a complete Model 97 mortar, you can fire U.S. M43A1 shells using their range tables. The Japanese Model 100 shells may also be fired provided U.S. increments are substituted for the Jap propellant.

The U.S. mortar sight M4 can be used on the Jap mortar.



IN BRIEF

JAP SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER

Capture on Luzon of a Model 38 (1905) 150-mm howitzer mounted on the chassis of an improved Model 97 (1937) medium tank gives U.S. forces their first specimen of Japanese self-propelled artillery.

Appearance of such a weapon in combat had been expected since October 1941 when the British reported the existence of a Japanese self-propelled gun, believed to have been an experimental model. The self-propelled version of the 150-mm howitzer is reported to have a maximum depression of -5 degrees and a maximum elevation of 30 degrees. No details of traverse are available. The howitzer and its crew are protected by a shield, 1 inch thick in front and $\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick on the sides.

It is surprising to find the Model 38 howitzer used in this self-propelled role, since it had been regarded as obsolete because of antiquated design, low muzzle velocity, and slow rate of fire.

The Model 97 (1937) medium tank, the chassis of which has been adapted for this self-propelled howitzer, is the most modern Japanese medium tank encountered to date. The complete tank weighs approximately 15 tons. As far as is known, the chassis of the original and improved models of this tank



The Model 38 (1905) 150-mm howitzer on an improved Model 97 (1937) medium tank chassis.

are identical. Both have a suspension with six bogie wheels and front-sprocket drive; a 12-cylinder, air-cooled Diesel engine developing 150 horsepower at 1,500 revolutions per minute; and frontal armor thickness of 25-mm (0.98 inch).

SUICIDE ASSAULT UNITS

As the war gets tougher and tougher for the Japs, and as the enemy discovers that his weapons and tactics become less and less effective, Japanese commanders are apt to turn to the use of the so-called *Kirikomi Tai*, or "suicide assault unit", as a means of harassing the U.S. troops they are opposing.

Late in 1944 one Jap field army discovered that its officer strength was suffering "extreme losses" while acting in accord

with the then popular belief that such suicide units should be organized around key personnel, such as officers, as leaders.

To avoid such losses in the future, the army commander ordered that suicide assault units thenceforth would be composed of two or three men, with a superior private or a private first class as the leader. The army commander observed that, in an emergency, a platoon should be able to form more than 20 such units, and that the organization should be such that numerous suicide assault units could be employed simultaneously in an attack upon a single objective.

He directed that men of suicide assault units not only should have a thorough knowledge of the enemy (U.S.) situation and the terrain, but should be prepared in spirit so that they might start out with the certainty of victory in their hearts.


"Gnats," he said, "can overcome the king of beasts."

NEW HAND GRENADE

A new Jap hand grenade of simple design, apparently manufactured in a Manila factory, has made its appearance in the fighting on Luzon.

A substitute for standard types, this grenade has been found in two main models—one with a cast body, the other manufactured from 3-inch sections of galvanized iron pipe—and is 2 inches in diameter. The grenade is filled with TNT, and, in the case of the pipe sections, the ends are closed by metal disks.

The detonator consists of an ordinary blasting cap crimped to a 1½-inch length of safety fuze. The other end of the fuze is crimped in a .22 caliber rimfire cartridge. This whole unit is set into the top of the grenade through a 1-inch length of iron tube large enough to hold the cartridge with the rimfire end exposed. A small hole is punched in the cartridge near its base to form an escape port for smoke from the fuze when it is



Quarter-section sketch of Jap hand grenade manufactured in Manila.

ignited. The fuze is ignited by striking the exposed base of the cartridge against a hard object. Some grenades have been found with small, wooden protective covers fitted over the cartridges.

A Japanese instruction sheet found in a box of these grenades gives the following directions:

1. Remove paper wrapping (or protective wooden block).
2. Upon striking the detonating cap against a hard object such as a rock, you will hear a weak sound.
3. Smoke will appear from the hole. Grenade will burst about 5 or 6 seconds after detonation. . . . There is likely to be a misfire if the detonating cap is struck incorrectly. It is of course very dangerous to handle a faulty grenade; therefore special precautions must be taken. . . .

SHOULDER-PACK MINE

When Japanese reinforcements landed at Ormoc during the Leyte operation and failed to encounter any American tanks, some enemy engineer troops were denied the opportunity of launching an attack with a novel suicide antitank weapon—the so-called “shoulder pack” antitank mine.

Reported to have been manufactured in Manila, the shoulder-pack mine is obviously an improvised demolition. It consists of a cube-shaped box, 11 inches square, fitted with rope shoulder straps. Filled with 16 to 20 pounds of explosive, the demolition is exploded by pulling a 36-inch pull cord attached to a fuze set in the top of the box.

The suicide soldier who uses this mine is supposed to try to destroy a tank and its crew by falling between the tracks of an oncoming tank and pulling the fuze cord of the mine which is strapped to his back. As yet there are no reports of this demolition being used successfully by the enemy.

BOOBY TRAP

U.S. troops in the Pacific should be wary of a new Japanese incendiary device or booby-trap igniter which may be mistaken for a greenish-black celluloid cigar case. Igniters of this type have been recovered on Luzon.

Shaped like a container for three cigars, the device is built with three longitudinal sections, two of which are loaded with an incendiary mixture. The third, or middle, section holds a spring-loaded striker which, when released, strikes a match head, thus igniting the incendiary mixture.

A slot in the top of one of the flat sides of the case holds a trigger blade. When this blade is pulled out of the slot, the striker is released. This enables the trap to be fired by a trip wire, which can be attached to the blade. A secondary delay-igniting system involving a vial of acid which, when broken,

in time corrodes a retaining wire and thus releases the striker is also contained in the center section.

This igniter appears to have been devised as a means of booby-trapping or sabotaging stores of inflammable material such as gasoline dumps, warehouses, and similar installations. However, it probably would cause fatal injury to anyone setting it off. Consequently, all men except personnel authorized to do so are cautioned not to handle this device. Qualified bomb disposal personnel may neutralize the igniter by inserting a knife blade into the trigger slot and then immersing the igniter in water for several hours. Since there are two slots in the case, care must be taken to insert the knife blade into the smaller opening *only*.

JAPANESE SIGNPOSTS

The inability of the average American or other Allied soldier to read and interpret Japanese signs sometimes causes an unnecessary loss of life. The Japanese persist in regarding their language as a code undecipherable to Allied soldiers, and do not hesitate to mark openly with signs such danger spots as areas and installations which have been mined or booby-trapped.

During the New Guinea campaign, five men in a jeep were killed when they drove into a minefield which had been marked plainly for Japanese troops to avoid. Only after the accident was it discovered that the area was defined by some 20 signs—all in Japanese.

In Japan proper, extensive use is made of signs and notices. Because this tendency has carried over into army life, it would be well for U.S. troops to take advantage of it and memorize the principal warning signs likely to be encountered in the field. For the benefit of those interested, they are published on page 39.

危ない

DANGEROUS

注意

TAKE CARE

地雷あり

LAND MINES
HERE


危険

DANGER

觸るな

DON'T TOUCH

Japanese warning signs.



"THE HEAVY MOBILE PUNCH"

Recently the Germans have intensified their efforts to exploit armor, in spite of the deteriorating situation. These notes reveal the tactics of German armor at the present time.



Alarmed by the growing German tendency, early in 1945, to commit armor in small groups, or even singly, General Student, Supreme Commander of a German army group, made a vigorous attempt to correct this practice. General Student was shrewd enough to know that the reason for so much dispersion of armored equipment within his command was the very natural anxiety of his troops to obtain security in all localities. In stressing that strong measures would be necessary

“to combat the tendency prevailing in the infantry to split up assault-gun battalions and tank, assault-gun, and tank-destroyer companies,” Student pointed out that success is achieved only by commitment in a body—in battery or company strength, at least—at points of main effort. In effect, what he demanded was a return to normal German doctrine.

When tanks, assault guns, or tank destroyers lose their full mobility because of Allied action or mechanical defects, the General observed, it is folly to retain such equipment in the line merely so that their weapons can be utilized.

In the light of the situation then existing, he declared, “The fuel and spare-parts situation does not permit so much as 1 meter of unnecessary travel.” As a result, he allowed only corps or divisions to decide on, and supervise, the shifting, routing, and other movement of tank and assault-gun units.

As to commitment, General Student ordered that if, in a battery or company, the number of weapons ready for action should drop to less than three, the unit was to be committed only in conjunction with other tank or assault-gun units until the weapons could be built up to their full strength.

“I prohibit the piecemeal commitment of tanks, assault guns, or tank destroyers,” the General ordered.

Divisions which had tank, assault-gun, or tank-destroyer units assigned to them were to keep a reserve of these weapons in readiness, preferably in company or battery strength. After a commitment, such a reserve was to be restored to full strength as rapidly as possible. For security reasons, these reserve weapons were not to remain in the main line of resistance.

Of timely value, in connection with these problems with which General Student has had to cope, is some further information from a well-informed and credible prisoner of war.

The primary mission of German tanks, as this source explains, is to provide the heavy mobile punch. This is why

“piecemeal commitment” violates the basic German canon of tank warfare. And it also explains why the enemy has gone to such great lengths to increase the caliber and muzzle velocity



This is the latest model of the Pz.Kpfw. Panther.

of his tank guns. The better the gun, the better the tank, according to the German way of thinking. Machine guns play a secondary role, and are used relatively little, except against tank hunters. A hard-hitting tank that can crush steel is the equipment in which the Germans now place their faith, believing, as they do, that such tanks must clear the way for Panzer Grenadier elements to advance with their automatic weapons.

Conforming to this tactical doctrine, the Panther has a super-long 75-mm gun. Panther personnel, according to this prisoner-of-war source, are trained to engage a Sherman tank without hesitation at a range of from 2,000 to 2,200 yards. They are

taught that while the preferable range of 800 to 900 yards will improve accuracy, it will not add greatly to the punch. The gun has an optical sight with three graduations: one for high-explosive shells, one for armor-piercing shells, and the third for the coaxially-mounted machine gun. Each graduation has its own range subdivision. According to the source, the gun is seldom, if ever, used as indirect artillery.

This source had been taught that, in the approach march, the tanks moved in column, covered by eight-wheel armored reconnaissance cars ahead. These vehicles, he states, are part of the reconnaissance platoon of each tank battalion. If contact with hostile armor is made, the tanks deploy and attack, echeloned in depth. However, in the battle around Noville on Christmas Day, these tactics were not followed. A Captain Hingst, commanding officer of a 1st (German tank) Battalion, ordered all tanks to attack in a shallow skirmish line. The U. S. commander quickly sized up the situation, and in 45 minutes his Shermans had completely destroyed six Panthers. The Germans withdrew, and Hingst was replaced by a Captain Scheer, commanding officer of the 2d Battalion. What was left of the two battalions was combined into an improvised team. Captain Scheer then tried to bypass the U. S. center of resistance, but it was too tough a nut for him to crack.

An interesting prisoner-of-war disclosure confirms the existence of a German order to the effect that if a hopeless situation develops, and if a unit is threatened with capture or annihilation, all officers and sergeants are to withdraw and report to the next higher command. It is explained that this measure was adopted to reduce the heavy battle losses in unit leaders.



ALLIED COMBAT EFFICIENCY

AS THE GERMANS SEE IT

An analysis of a number of orders, directives, and other documents from high German headquarters, discussing Allied combat efficiency *prior* to our series of pushes early in 1945, reveals that in general the German military mind respects and fears the planning and execution of Allied military moves in the West. While still asserting the superiority of German leadership and the German soldier, the enemy admits that Allied superiority in matériel has deprived the Germans of freedom of action and has necessitated a complete change of tactics.

Here is a digest of representative German Army opinion regarding Allied methods, together with some comments as to how the Germans have been compelled to modify their own tactics.

PLANNING

Allied operations are prepared very carefully; they are preceded by thorough air and ground reconnaissance, and are based on admirable air photographs. Since May 1944 they have been carried out on a broad front, sometimes with far-reaching objectives that landing troops have fought as long as 2 weeks to achieve. The Allied method of building up a point of main effort in the attack is excellent.

LEADERSHIP

The Allied higher commanders rely on methodical planning down to the last detail and on material superiority. Even the small-unit commanders are imbued with this philosophy; they are not in the habit of exploiting independently any favorable turn that the fighting takes.

PREPARATION

Battle reconnaissance in daylight is cautious; as a rule, Allied patrols withdraw as soon as German fire has been drawn and artillery positions disclosed. Battle reconnaissance at night is carried out by strong, well-trained assault detachments, which employ such ruses as issuing commands in German. The Americans send out detachments ranging up to a company in strength.

The assembly of attacking troops is well camouflaged, and often is made under cover of a smoke screen.

The preliminary concentration of artillery fire and pattern bombing is always confined to the point where the breakthrough is to be made. However, the Allies have ample resources to put down concentrated fire simultaneously at another point, as a feint.

As a result of Allied superiority in air power and matériel, the German main line of resistance will be held with weak forces only, in order to provide every unit with local reserves. This is the least objectionable of the several alternatives, because Allied attacks normally confine themselves to occupying the main line of resistance; Allied troops can easily be dislodged from these positions by means of immediate local counterattacks.

INFANTRY

In the attack, Allied infantry assault detachments work their way forward on a broad front, with strong fire support from tanks and artillery. Strongpoints always are bypassed. Simultaneous feint attacks by infantry often are made at a distance of 900 to 1,000 yards from the real sector of attack. As a result of their inflexible methods, Allied infantrymen are unaccustomed to exploiting local penetrations by means of immediate follow-up thrusts, even when such activity would seem to offer good chances of success.

ARTILLERY

Allied artillery merits the highest praise. It is adaptable, and is skilled at concentrated precision fire delivered by large formations. Observation by spotting aircraft and forward observers is incessant and complete. Fire is never halted on account of imperfect observation, but is carried on from the map. German mortar positions, despite frequent moves and careful camouflage, are quickly located and engaged, apparently by means of special sound-ranging apparatus. German dummy positions often are engaged with great expenditure of ammunition. "Shock shells" used at the end of the preliminary bombardment enable the infantry to penetrate German forward defensive positions just as the last artillery rounds are being fired. However, this tactic warns the defender's local reserves of the beginning of the assault, and gives them the signal for the counterattack.

TANKS

The general performance of Allied tanks has been outstanding, even in terrain—such as much of that in Italy—regarded as impassable for German tanks.

During an Allied tank attack in the daytime, German observation is blinded by smoke.

It should be noted that Allied tanks avoid engaging German tanks. Allied tanks are highly vulnerable to close-combat weapons; if German antitank close-combat weapons are detected, Allied tanks will halt about 170 yards outside the effective range. Normally, the actual tank attack is preceded by a wave of light tanks, to lead the defender to disclose his artillery and antitank weapons.

To destroy an Allied tank advance, German light and heavy antitank guns should be well dug-in, and must be combined with antitank close-combat weapons. Allied tanks will be permitted to approach within close range, and then destroyed. In view of the exceptional performance of Allied tanks, antitank close-combat weapons must be held in readiness, even in terrain which might be considered impassable for German tanks.

AIR FORCES

Complete Allied control of the air must be conceded. As a result, German tactics are changing. The only course remaining is to carry

out immediate local counterattacks with small assault detachments, to which single tanks can be attached. Supply is effectively disrupted by road strafing; however during lulls, which occur regularly—between 1100 and 1400, as a rule—vehicles in small groups of not more than three or four are sent out with urgently needed supplies. German antiaircraft positions evacuated during the night often are attacked on the following day. Wrecked vehicles so disposed as to resemble a transport column have been used successfully as bait to lure Allied fighter-bombers into surprise fire delivered from concealed antiaircraft positions. Single unserviceable vehicles also have been used for this purpose. Since Allied planes continue bombing until the objective is set on fire, incendiary and smoke grenades are recommended as part of the decoy equipment.

German antiaircraft defense must be limited to concentrations at certain points. Because of Allied air superiority, the positions must be changed from day to day; such changes should be made at night. It has been proved useful to enforce a two-hour fire silence in each new position, to trap Allied fighter bombers.

CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

The Allied main defensive belt generally is well adapted to the terrain, and often is situated on reverse slopes. Positions are badly camouflaged, however, and mines are laid hastily and in the open. The main defense zone does not have much depth. In the daytime the forward edge is manned only by isolated observers and machine guns, and the remaining troops are withdrawn for rest. Tank units are mostly kept in the rear, in readiness for prompt counterattacks.

GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

Planned counterattacks are futile, but immediate local counterattacks are nearly always successful and should be made before the situation has become clarified. Sealing Allied penetrations is solely the mission of local reserves and emergency units (*Alarmeinheiten*) formed from headquarters, supply services, and so on.

OTHER GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES


All headquarters in the field, including those of higher commands, must be bombproof, and provisions must be made for alternate loca-

tions. No reliance can be placed on telephone communications in large-scale actions, since such communications usually are destroyed completely by the Allied preliminary bombardment. Communications therefore must be maintained by signalling or by liaison officers and runners.


Supply can proceed only in darkness. Motor vehicles will not drive at more than 25 miles an hour, so that, in the event of a surprise air attack, they can leave the road immediately and take cover in the terrain nearby. Since the nights are not long enough to permit adequate supplies to be brought forward, the issue of ammunition is insufficient for effective German counterbattery fire; for similar reasons, the employment of tanks in large numbers has had to be curtailed appreciably.

REMOTE-CONTROLLED MACHINE GUN


FOR ASSAULT GUNS AND TANK DESTROYERS



The Germans are equipping tank destroyers and assault guns with an indirect-laying and indirect-aiming device so that the personnel of these heavy armored vehicles can put up an improved defense against close-in attacks without exposing themselves. The new device consists of a standard light machine gun, the *M.G. 34*, mounted on a hollow-column base on top of the armored fighting compartment. Controls are fitted so that the gunner can aim, elevate, and traverse the gun from his seat



An armored shield protects the mechanism of the gun and also the mount.



The gunner remains inside the armored fighting compartment. With one hand he controls the traverse; with the other, the elevation. He aims by means of a periscope. To reload, he must open a hatch.

inside the vehicle. The gun's shield is so designed that a standard 50-round drum may be attached to the left of the gun's receiver.

This remote-controlled gun differs from previous forms of superstructure-mounted machine guns in that each of the conventional types must be operated by a man standing with his head and shoulders exposed above an open hatch.

Although some protection is afforded by a folding shield which faces forward, the conventional mounts permit forward fire only. The new type of mount is designed to give protection against attack from sides and rear, as well, and to supplement the fire of the bow gun now fitted on the latest German tank destroyers.



Discovered in Combat—III

These brief paragraphs of timely intelligence regarding German small-unit tactics and weapons have been furnished in part by Allied military observers, and in part by company officers and enlisted men who have been serving in the various European combat zones.



USE OF FLARES TO SPOT NIGHT PATROLS

“In Italy we’ve had experiences with German lantern flares used for the purpose of detecting the presence of Allied night patrols. Once the Germans shot lantern flares into the air on four successive nights, and when these flares opened, which they did very suddenly, they illuminated an area about the size of a football field. There was no telltale flash or streak preceding the illumination; as a result, patrol personnel had no advance warning that flares were about to burst. The illumination would begin with three or four bright lights in a circle, giving the general appearance of a chandelier. These lights would burn brightly for about 10 seconds. Then, after a blackout lasting for several seconds, the illumination would recur for a few more seconds. If members of an Allied patrol start moving after the flare has blacked out for the first time, the Germans detect this movement when the flare suddenly recurs; within a few minutes, mortar fire is placed on, or near, the patrol. Experience taught us not to move until we were fairly sure that there would be no recurrence of the illumination.”

NOTE ON AN OLD TRICK

“By this time everybody has heard that the enemy booby-traps the bodies of dead men, but a word about the way this filthy Kraut trick is performed—at least, by the Germans we’ve been fighting—might be worth mentioning. The enemy places a grenade in a dead soldier’s pocket, and connects the grenade, by means of a pull wire or cord, to a stake buried in the ground. When the body is moved, the jerking of the wire explodes the grenade. We always check the pockets carefully before we move a body.”

“SPIDER HOLES”

“‘Spider holes’ are what we call the ground positions that German snipers sometimes use. These holes are 2½ to 3 feet in



diameter and approximately 6 feet deep. Such a hole is covered with a camouflaged lid made of criss-crossed sticks tied securely together with wire or cord, with a top layer of sod. The sod is neatly cut and trimmed to match the surrounding terrain. Thin wire holds the sod in place over the criss-crossed sticks. A sniper can tilt the lid slightly in order to observe his surroundings; if he chooses to, he can raise the lid and slide the whole thing aside.

"To men who have been accustomed to watching trees and other elevated places for signs of snipers, these ground positions may be a totally new thing, and a G.I. may be caught off guard.

"The sniper's pet tactic is to fire on the first column coming up, and do all the damage he can. When the U.S. fire gets too hot for him, he closes the lid and waits for the first column to pass. Then he surrenders to the next column. It is difficult to detect the sniper's 'spider hole' because of its excellent camouflage."

USE OF RICOCHET FIRE

"In Italy the Germans often have employed ricochet fire in terrain honeycombed with stone walls. They use this tactic to pin us down and delay an advance. I'll give you an example of ricochet fire used in this manner.

"My platoon was moving down a narrow Italian road, and had approached to within 25 feet of a stone wall that ran along the far shoulder of a left-hand curve in the road. At this point the road made about a 75-degree bend to our left. It was morning, and visibility was good. The road beyond the bend had been scouted, and no evidence of the enemy had been observed. Small trees grew in clusters at irregular intervals along the road. Flat farmland bordered each side of the road to a depth of about 50 yards, and then rolling hills gradually ascended to a height of approximately 75 feet.

"The leading platoon was marching about 25 yards ahead of the second platoon, as a security measure. As my platoon began to enter the curve in the road, a heavy stream of machine-gun bullets spattered against the wall on our right. Within a few seconds, ten of my men lay dead or wounded in the road. A strong patrol was dispatched immediately to knock out the enemy machine-gun nest that had subjected us to this ricochet fire. When the patrol returned after destroying the machine-gun nest, it reported that the German machine gunners had been operating from a small hill overlooking the bend in the road. At a range of about 100 yards, the Germans had zeroed in their guns on the middle of the stone wall.

"The machine-gun bullet becomes dum-dummed when it strikes a hard, smooth surface, and the slug has a tearing effect on personnel. Because of the inherent inaccuracy of this ricochet type of firing, it is difficult to judge the extent of the area affected by the rebounding bullets. The pattern is highly irregular."



MINING SUPPLY PATHS

“The Germans in Italy have been very skillful at crawling through our lines at night, usually moving via our supply ditches. They have a habit of laying mines in our supply trails, and then crawling back to their own lines. Sometimes they fail to get back; on several occasions we have discovered these night crawlers trying to hide themselves under our rations and water.”

MORTAR POSITIONS

“From a German operations map, we learned that we had been looking for the enemy’s mortars too close up. His 120-mm mortars were to the rear of his artillery positions.”

H-HOUR

“The Germans always attacked us at 2300 or at 0600, and were especially persistent about Sunday mornings. They might

not do anything for a whole week, but you could depend on that Sunday morning attack being right on schedule at 0600."

MACHINE-GUN TACTIC

"Our company was moving toward Arnhem, after having captured our objective of Veghel, in Holland. At 0200 my squad and another squad were ordered to take a German position consisting of what was thought to be a machine gun and 11 riflemen, all dug-in around an old house near an orchard.

"When my squad had advanced within 25 yards of this position, the enemy opened fire with three machine guns instead of one. Two machine guns, one on each flank, fired tracers at approximately head-high elevation. The gun in the middle delivered grazing fire about 6 inches above the ground, and did not use tracers. As a result, the center machine gun was extremely difficult to locate, and we were unable to take the position."

HOW THE GERMANS RECAPTURED A TOWN

"Our company moved into the town of X, in France, with little opposition from the Germans. The enemy had four anti-tank guns protecting the road leading into the town, but these guns were easily knocked out by rifle fire when the Germans made the mistake of allowing our small-arms fire to get within range of the antitank guns. After our company had moved into the town, our men were placed in houses chosen for this purpose. There was no systematic rounding-up of the civilians.

"At 2100 on the same day, the Germans counterattacked. Their tactics consisted of sending approximately one company of infantry into the outskirts of the town, apparently as an advance element. Two Panther tanks stayed outside the town, beyond the range of rifle fire, and fired their 75-mm shells into the area that our troops were occupying. These tanks fired with

remarkable accuracy, and aimed only at those buildings in which our troops had been placed. It is my belief that the civilians of the town had informed the enemy as to the exact whereabouts of our troops.

"Since the tanks stayed out of range of our small-arms fire, there was little our company could do to put them out of commission. Small patrols were sent out, but they were unable to get through the German infantry, and thus were unable to contact the tanks. Nor were we able to get our bazookas within range of this armor.

"The Germans kept up fire from the 75's, and eventually forced our company to retire from the town."

NOTE ON THE SCHUMINE

The Corps of Engineers recommends taking out the fuze and charge of the German *Schümine* when the mine is to be transported, even for short distances.

On page 79 of *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 1, this statement is made: "When it (the *Schümine*) must be transported over short distances, it can be disarmed by placing the link in the vertical position and securing the lid in the closed position." This method is no longer to be used.





NEW TRIP DEVICES FOR LOCAL DEFENSE

Of special significance to small units are the new developments that appear, from time to time, in the field of German trip devices. This month two such developments have been reported. They are fresh additions to the accumulating proof of the enemy's interest in devising simple and inexpensive aids to static defense. As such, they belong in the same category with the *Panzerfaust* rigged as an automatic obstacle, a novel trip device which was described in the April issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin*.

MACHINE GUN ACTIVATED BY TRIP WIRE

Recent evidence indicates that a German 7.92-mm machine gun, which the enemy designates as the *Zf. Ger. 38*, is being used as a static-defense weapon activated by a trip wire. The accompanying sketch shows how the weapon is rigged. There is also a possibility that it may be used along roads, as part of an ambush against vehicles. According to a German document, the weapon originally was intended for use only as a range-finding and adjustment device.



At the top is the Zf.Ger.38; at the bottom, the Zf.Ger.38 with trip wire.

The *Zf. Ger. 38* is a fully automatic machine gun. It is blow-back-operated, magazine-fed, and air-cooled. The magazine feeds in from the left side. Three folding legs support the weapon. To stabilize the mount and thus prevent the weapon from being moved out of line by its own recoil, a stake may be driven through the hole that has been bored in each leg. Laying for elevation is accomplished by building up the legs or by digging the soil away beneath them. The barrel is threaded,

presumably for a squeeze-bore attachment for firing wooden bullets.


The gun's receiver is made of a steel tube. The bolt is cut away for lightness, and rides on turned collars at each end. The sear is located in the trigger housing, which is mounted on top of the receiver. It is released by the camming action of the sear on a V-block. Use of this V-block allows the sear to be released by a pull either way, thus firing the weapon. The cocking lever is attached to the underside of the rear bolt collar, cocking is accomplished by pulling the cocking lever rearward until the sear catches. The safety is similar to the one used on the *M.P. 38* and the *M.P. 40*.

To lock the bolt in the safe position, the operator pulls the bolt past the sear, and inserts the cocking lever into the cocking lever safety slot.

The *Zf. Ger. 38* is about $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches high, and has an overall length of $42\frac{1}{4}$ inches. The barrel is about $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches long. The magazine has a capacity of 70 rounds, and, according to a German document, lubricated ammunition must be used.

IMPROVISED WHISTLE ALARM

A German improvised whistle alarm, which can be armed and left for a long period of time, is reported to be used in connection with barbed-wire obstacles and other deliberate obstructions. A series of such devices, carefully placed along the forward edge of a long obstacle, might provide the Germans with a useful automatic sentry system. However, the noise made by the standard German whistling cartridge (*Pfeifpatrone*), which is used in the device, is too feeble to be heard above most battle noises; as a result, the whistle alarm can be of practical value to the enemy only in a static local situation.



German improvised whistle alarm.

The construction of the improvised whistle alarm is extremely simple. A *Pfeifpatrone* cartridge and a Z.Z. 42 pull fuze are attached to one end of a straight slab of wood. The other end may be forced into the ground so that the unit stands upright, or may be secured in that same position to any stable object. When the trip wire leading from the fuze is disturbed, the device is fired.



THE PANZERHANDMINE 3

A MAGNETIC HOLLOW CHARGE


The *Panzerhandmine 3* (which the Germans abbreviate to *P.H.M. 3*) is a magnetic hollow charge intended for use as a close-combat weapon against Allied tanks and similar armored targets. A series of magnets around the bottom of the charge cause the weapon to adhere to the target. The charge is German Air Force issue, and is the Air Force counterpart of the standard German Army magnetic hollow charge 3 kg. (*Haftholladung 3 Kg.*), which it resembles in design and employment.

German documents state that the *Panzerhandmine 3* will penetrate 6-inch armor plate, creating a 11 $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch hole and causing a great deal of **scaling** within the vehicle. Outside the vehicle, metal splinters may be expected to be hurled as far away as 100 yards.

This hollow-charge weapon is 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches high and 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter, and weighs 8 pounds. It contains a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -pound charge of TNT or RDX/TNT. A compressed-paper body encases the charge and the magnets. A web carrying handle is attached to a metal neck band. The hemispherical cavity of the hollow charge is closed with a metal sheet liner.



The Panzerhandmine 3, a magnetic hollow charge.



A bottom view of the Panzerhandmine 3. Note the six magnets for use against metal surfaces, and the keeper with spikes for use against wooden surfaces.

Three pairs of magnets are mounted around the interior of the compressed-paper skirt. In transit these magnets are protected by an iron keeper ring, which has a web handle fastened to it for easy withdrawal. On one side of the keeper are three equidistant spikes, which permit the charge to be attached to wooden surfaces. The keeper is reversed in transit, so that the spikes fit between the magnets.

The *Panzerhandmine 3* is fired with a yellow-head, $7\frac{1}{2}$ -second-delay friction igniter.




КРАСНОАРМЕЕЦ*

Hundreds of thousands of G. I.'s are about to meet, for the first time, the straight-shooting and likable foot-sloggers of the Red Army, as well as men from other branches of that heroic Service. Here are some useful pointers about these comrades-in-arms.

THE MAN AND HIS MOTHERLAND

To many Americans, the Red Army is the Russian Army, and the Soviet Union is Russia. These impressions are incorrect. When Soviet citizens talk of the Russian Army, they mean the Imperial Russian Army as it existed prior to the 1917 Red Revolution. Russia, to them, means the territory of Great Russia. Today, Great Russia is organized as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and is but one of the 16 republics which are united to form the Soviet Union. The correct name for the Soviet Union is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the U.S.S.R. In the Cyrillic alphabet used in the U.S.S.R., this abbreviation appears as C.C.C.P. The correct name for the army of the U.S.S.R. is a simple one: the Red Army. The navy is the Red Navy.

* The Red Army soldier.



The Red Army man is a proud soldier. He may be a Slav, like the young fellow above, or he may be a Mongol, a Tartar, a Kurd, an Armenian, or may belong to still some other racial group.



The Red Army does "Eyes Left" or "Right" with rifles in this position. These men are wearing the old blouse with turned-down collar. This type was superseded in 1943, but still may be encountered.

The U.S.S.R.'s republics include peoples of many racial types, speaking well over a hundred different languages. In contrast to the Russianizing policy of the old Tsarist government, the U.S.S.R. has sought to foster the natural cultural development of each of these peoples, while at the same time it has attempted to integrate each group into the over-all working scheme of the union of federated republics. Russian happens to be the common language, mainly because its use became so widespread during the days of the Russian Empire.

The extent of Russian influence in the U.S.S.R. is naturally affected by the proportion of Russians included in the total population of the Soviet Union. Within Russia—that is, within the R.S.F.S.R.—are enough people to total almost 70 percent



This cavalry guard of honor appears in service dress with visored caps. Such guard mounts are stood by PFC's only. The photo illustrates the old style of rank insignia, now replaced by epaulets.

of the population of the U.S.S.R. White Russians and Ukrainians bring the number of people of Slavic origin up to 76 percent of the total population of the Union. The Ukrainians themselves number some 39 million, and also are an important group.

Although officers, specialists, and career soldiers representing all the Soviet peoples may be found throughout the entire Red Army, an attempt has been made to mobilize the latter on a territorial basis. Post-war plans envisage mobilizing entirely by republics, with each republic having an autonomous army. At present, all officers speak Russian, although with varying degrees of fluency.

Red Army soldiers are extremely proud of their nation's history, which is connected with the earliest Eastern and Western cultures. For instance, early Greek colonies were established on the shores of the Black Sea, while areas in Central Asia date back to about 4,000 B.C. However, the peoples of the Soviet Union were among the last in the modern world to start along the path to wealth and power. Very sparsely populated to begin with—and a path, rather than a settling place, for the barbarian hordes on their way to Western Europe—the European part of the U.S.S.R. received a heavy set-back during the years 1238-1462, when the Mongols conquered and devastated the country.

The areas to be developed in the Russias and in the Ukraine were vast. Just as young men in America went West, in European Russia they went East. In the Seventeenth Century, the Russians reached the Pacific. In the Eighteenth Century, they expanded their Pacific Empire down through Alaska and Canada into Northern California. In the Nineteenth Century, they withdrew to some extent from the Pacific, selling Alaska to the U.S. and concentrating on expansion in Central Asia. Nevertheless, when the Revolution came in 1917, even European Russia was relatively backward and undeveloped. Although the Russia of 1917 had some very fine manufacturing plants, these were not numerous. The Russian Empire as a whole had been touched only slightly by modern industrialization.

The famous Five-Year Plans of the U.S.S.R. have been devoted to bring the whole vast area of the Soviets up to date. Because this program includes not merely the European part of the U.S.S.R., but the vast reaches of Siberia and Central Asia, the Soviet peoples have had to face a terrific job of pioneering.

Americans will find that Red Army men not only are a little like U.S. frontiersmen, because of their civilian life, but are willing to learn and anxious to excel. The Red soldiers are proud, and also very sensitive about their weaknesses. However,

they have a genuine respect for the mechanical and industrial achievement of American civilization. On the whole, Red Army men are simple, forthright, and direct. They are fond of jokes and horseplay.

The real frontiersmen are the Cossacks. These are descendants of restless Ukrainians and others who, centuries ago, went south toward the mouth of the Don and Terek Rivers. Their object was to escape from serfdom, a form of slavery that was not abolished by the Tsars until 1861. On the frontiers the Cossacks were able to originate their own social organization, which



Red Army mountain troops may wear special clothing. The uniform shown here includes a double-breasted jacket and long, baggy pants. The fur cap is common to all troops below the rank of general.



The present Red Army steel helmet resembles that worn by the U.S. Army. It was introduced shortly before the outbreak of war, and succeeded an earlier type, which resembled the German steel helmet.

did not include enslavement of the peasantry. Expansion of Tsarist power caught up with the Cossacks eventually, and an agreement had to be reached. Catherine the Great (1762-1796) effected a compromise whereby the Cossacks received special social privileges in return for their guardianship of the frontiers. Ever-anxious for a fight, the Cossacks were glad to serve the Empire, and have proved equally good soldiers in the service of the U.S.S.R. The most outstanding Cossacks are those from the Don, Kuban, and Terek areas; although Cossacks may be found eastward almost to the Pacific.


The Red Army's record in the war has made the Soviet soldiers proud and completely self-confident. They consider that they have done most of the fighting on the United Nations' side.

Without reckoning civilian losses through German massacre and starvation, the U.S.S.R.'s armed forces have suffered the greatest number of casualties. And, in turn these armed forces have been responsible for a majority of German military casualties.


Red Army men realize this, and know that they were the first outfit to slow down the mass of the *Wehrmacht*, long before other United Nations' ground forces could strike an effective blow to distract and draw off the Nazis. They were also the first to inflict a staggering initial defeat on the Germans. This they accomplished by the annihilation of von Paulus's Sixth Army at Stalingrad.

Red soldiers are thankful for Lend-Lease, but they are well aware of the fact that their own production resources are gigantic. They know, too, that these plants have turned out first-rate weapons of the most advanced designs, and that in general the tactical concepts behind their ordnance designs have kept most of their weapons ahead of, or at least equal to, the best that the Nazis could put in the field simultaneously. They know that the Red Army originated tank-borne infantry, parachute troops, rockets from planes and rockets from ground launchers, heavy tanks with high velocity guns, and a host of other developments. They know that they are tough fighters, especially in infantry assault work. They are proud that the Germans fear them. They know that the war has molded their tactics into excellent shape, and that their authorities are constantly striving to improve the Red Army's weapons and techniques.


This knowledge results in a very high morale. From the Soviet soldier's point of view, his Army is a great success. Also, he feels that his country will have a great future the moment it can use its vast resources and production facilities in making civilian goods instead of preparing for war. He believes that the U.S.S.R. has become the strongest power in Europe, and that she now can look to the well-being of her people.




**FIRST OR MASTER
SERGEANT**




**STAFF
SERGEANT**



SERGEANT



CORPORAL



PRIVATE, 1ST CLASS



PRIVATE

Field epaulets for noncoms and men have a khaki base, piping in color of arm, and no symbol. Service uniform epaulets for these grades have bases in the color of arm, with symbols also indicating arm.

INSIGNIA

The Red Army seeks to have its men well-dressed at all times. While all Red Army men wear epaulets, the noncoms and men wear ones of soft cloth. Officers wear stiff shoulder boards like U.S. Naval officers, except that the Red Army's type is much larger.

The arm or service to which a Red Army man belongs is shown by the color, or symbol and color, on the epaulet.



**BRIGADIER
GENERAL**



COLONEL
(Tank and
Mch Troops)




**LIEUTENANT
COLONEL**
(Signal Troops)




MAJOR
(Infantry)



CAPTAIN
(Air Force)



**SENIOR
LIEUTENANT**
(Artillery)




**1ST
LIEUTENANT**
(Cavalry)




**2ND
LIEUTENANT**
(Infantry)

The bases of officers' epaulets are khaki on the field uniform, and gold (for arms) or silver (for services) on the service uniform. Medical, veterinary, and J.A.G.D. officers wear narrow silver epaulets.

<i>Arm or Service.</i>	<i>Color of Epaulet Piping.</i>	<i>Symbol Worn on Epaulet.</i>
Infantry	Magenta	None
Cavalry (except Cossacks)	Blue	Crossed sabers and a horseshoe
Artillery	Crimson	Crossed cannon
Armored Force	Crimson	Tank
Air Force	Sky blue	Wings and propeller
Technical Troops	Black	Various types
Medical and Veterinary	Dark green	Snake and cup (gold-medical; silver-veterinary)



At the left is the Red Army field uniform for officers; at the right, the one for noncoms and men. Note the characteristic stand-up collar, the epaulets, and the boots-breeches-pullover blouse combination.



The Gold Star hangs from a gold clasp with a red ribbon.

The American G.I. cannot be expected to recognize all Red Army decorations, but there are a few which merit special attention. Wound stripes, for instance, are worn as bars on the right breast. A gold bar indicates a severe wound; a red bar, a light wound. Some Red Army men may be seen with as many as six wound bars—yet they are still in the fight and eager to keep at grips with the enemy.

Also worn on the right breast is the Guards Badge. This award takes the form of a red star encircled by a wreath, with the Russian for "Guards" in gold on a small red banner. Guards units are those which have distinguished themselves in action, and have therefore been awarded the privilege of adding "Guards" to their unit designation. Guards badges should not be confused with meritorious-service badges. The latter are silver, with the hammer and sickle on a red background.

The top decoration for valor, comparable to the Congressional Medal and to the Victoria Cross, is the Gold Star Medal, awarded only to some 3,600 officers and men during the past 4 years of war. The star is a plain, five-pointed gold star hanging from a plain red ribbon. It is worn above ordinary rows of

ribbons. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union, as well as membership in the Order of Lenin, is awarded automatically with the Gold Star. The wearer gets a small life pension, and can ride free in subways and street cars. Once a year he can travel free by rail to any point in the Soviet Union.


MILITARY COURTESY

In addressing one another, members of the Red Army never use the word "soldier". An enlisted man or noncom is a Red Army man— (*Krasnoarmeyets*), or, more generally, "combat soldier" (*Boyets*). In the same way, a Red sailor is a Red Navy man. Enlisted men—privates and PFC's—are referred to as a group by means of the word *Ryadovoi*, while noncoms are *Serzhant*. An individual is addressed by a superior or an inferior by his title of rank prefixed by "Comrade", as in "Comrade Colonel".

Polite usage dictates that equals call each other by their first name and their patronymic, i.e. Ivan Ivanovich (John the son of John). If these names are not known, the "Comrade" plus rank title is used. Juniors reply to commands without using the customary *Da*, which is "Yes" in Russian. Military custom prescribes instead a sort of "Aye, aye, sir"—pronounced "yest". It is correct for U.S. Army officers and men to address members of the Red Army by their grade title, or by their title and last name.



Insignia for Red Army traffic control MP's includes the red arm band (left) and the star which is carried by their motor vehicles.



Red Army traffic control MP's use these signals. The shaded flag is red; the other, white. Red and white lights are used at night.

MILITARY AND OTHER POLICE

Red Army MP's are of two types: the security MP's, and the traffic control MP's. The latter type belong to the Motor Transport and Road Maintenance Service of the Red Army. Traffic direction police wear red arm bands on which appears the letter "P". These arm bands are worn on the left arm. Their motor transport carries a five-pointed star surrounding a "P". Both men and women are used for traffic direction work. During the day, they may use flag signals; at night, they use lights. Security MP's belong to the local garrison or division, and are appointed by the division commander or other authority. Both traffic and security MP's have full police power, and, whether they are men or women, must be obeyed.

The Security Forces of the Soviet Union are not Army forces. They are N.K.V.D. personnel—men of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This organization supplies plainclothes police as well. N.K.V.D. Interior Troops are organized into arms and services like Army forces. Their color of arm is the same as for cavalry—blue—except that shoulder straps

appear with all the various arm and service symbols in combination with blue. Their service caps have sky-blue tops with a red band. These troops function on general security and counterintelligence missions.

Also under the N.K.V.D. are the Frontier Guards—the so-called “green hats”, a name deriving from the distinctive color of their service caps. The police proper of the U.S.S.R. also belong to the N.K.V.D. These police are called *Militia*, and wear dark blue uniforms, with caps with dark blue tops and light blue bands. Railway guards are part of the N.K.V.D. and wear uniforms like that of the police, except that the caps of the railway guards have red tops.

GUARD DUTY

Interior guard duty in the Red Army is similar to U.S. Army practice, except that Red Army procedure is somewhat simplified. The Red Army soldier's general orders merely state that a sentry is forbidden to sling his rifle, to leave his post, to sleep, to sit, to lean against anything, to talk, to eat, to drink, to smoke, to sing, to relieve himself, to take anything from anybody, or to interrupt his constant observation of things around him. If anyone disturbs his post, the sentry is to call the corporal of the guard.

Red Army challenging is streamlined. When a sentry spots a man in the vicinity of his post he commands “*Stoi!*” (pronounced “stoy”). This means “halt”, and the sentry means business. Do not hesitate, or try to run away. Halt immediately. After this first challenge, the sentry may challenge again, if his first command has not been heeded. This second challenge is “*Stoi! Strelyat Budu!*”. (The accent is placed on the second syllable of the second word and the first syllable of the last word: *StrelYAT BUdu.*) ..This command means: “Halt, or I will fire!”.

On challenging, Red Army sentries usually assume the position of "On guard". The Red Army FM on interior guard duty says: "After assuming the position of on guard, the sentry himself decides whether to lunge with the bayonet, or to shoot." There is no third challenge; two are all that Red Army sentries are required to give. However, the sentry may now command "*Stoi! Kto Idyot?*" The last two words are pronounced something like *kTAW idYOT*. This command means: "Halt! Who goes there?" For those who are not linguists, a correct reply would be:

Amerikanski Ofitser—If a commissioned officer or warrant officer.

Amerikanski Ryadovoi—If a private or PFC. (The Russian for "enlisted man" is pronounced "ree-ad-o-VOY".)

Amerikanski Serzhant—If a noncom.

Amerikanski Boyets—This form will cover all ranks.

At this stage, the sentry may command: "*Amerikanski Ofitser Ko Mnye*". (The next to last word is pronounced as it sounds: the last word "*M-NYEH*".) This command means: "American officer, come towards me", and is the equivalent of "Advance and be recognized". The sentry might also command: "*Ostalniye Na Myeste*". This is pronounced "*ostal-NEE-ye na MYES-teh*". It means: "Remain in place." If the sentry cannot satisfy himself as to the identity of the man ordered forward for recognition, he may command him to about-face and remain with his back toward the sentry. At this point the sentry will call the corporal of the guard. If a party is being challenged, the sentry will halt the whole with the first two challenges, and then may order forward the person answering the challenge "Who goes there?" When recognition has been made, the sentry relaxes his on guard position and assumes the position of attention, or otherwise indicates recognition.

Sentries also may call for a password. In the Red Army, regulations have required the use of the names of cities and towns, the password being changed daily. If the password is desired, the sentry will command "*Parol!*" (pronounced par-ROL). If the password is not known, the best reply for Americans is to state their rank and nationality, as above.

DO'S AND DON'TS

Since Red Army men and U.S. soldiers have so much in common, there is no reason why relations between the two armies should not be extremely cordial. To ensure good relationships, a few simple rules should be followed:

Don't talk politics—either domestic or international, either about the U.S.S.R. or about the U.S.A. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which is that the opinions of a member of the armed forces may be mistaken for official attitudes and policies.

Don't bluff or brag, especially about your home, your car, or your other property. Many Red Army men have lost their families and all they own in the war.

Don't underestimate the intelligence of Red Army men.

Don't try to get along only in English if you find yourself cooperating with Red Army units or personnel; try to learn as much Russian as you can.

Be frank and friendly, but firm. Red Army men are frank to the point of bluntness. They respect strength and despise weakness.

Be patient.

Mind your own business. The Red Army is very security-conscious; it operates on the same security principle as does the U.S. Army. Membership in the military force or commissioned rank does not automatically entitle a soldier to acquire every item of military information he chooses. Soldiers found in

areas without proper authorization may find themselves in a great deal of trouble—a Soviet guard house is no bed of roses!

DISTRIBUTION:

AAF (30); AGF (35); ASF (2); T of Opns (200) except MTO (5000), ETO (11,500), IB (1,000); Base Comds (10); Island Comds (10); Depts (10); Arm & Sv Bd (2); Def Comd (10); Tech Sv (10) except QMG (65), CWS (12); SvC (10); Area A SvC (10); HD (10); PC&S (1); SEPE (200); HRPE (6); Repl Dep (65); Gen & Sp Sv Sch (100); USMA (100); ROTC (3); UTC (30); RTC (150); Ord Dist (10); A (10); CHQ (10); D (2); B (2); R (2); Bn (2); C (2); AF (2); W (2); G (2); S (2); F (2).